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DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Trades Council: SUPREME COURT 
CLARIFIES THE PROVISO TO 
§8(6)(4) WHICH ALLOWS UNIONS 
TO CONDUCT INFORMATIONAL 
ACTIVITY. 
In DeBartolo Corp. fl. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Trades Council, __ U.S. _, 108 S. Ct. 
1392 (1988), the United States Supreme 
Court, on a petition for certiorari, ruled 
that peaceful handbilling, unaccompanied 
by picketing, urging a consumer boycott 
of a neutral employer was not coercive and 
therefore not a violation of § 8(bX4) of the 
National Labor Relations Act. 
The Florida Gulf Coast Building and 
Construction Trades Council (union) 
peacefully handbilled the customers of a 
shopping mall asking them not to shop at 
any of the mall's stores. The union's dis-
pute was with a construction company, for 
one of the mall's tenants, whom they alleg-
ed paid substandard wages and fringe bene-
fits to workers. The union hoped to 
influence the merchants, through a con-
sumer boycott, to put pressure on the con-
struction company. 
The owner of the mall, the Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo), filed 
a petition with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) charging an unfair 
labor practice pursuant to § 8(b)( 4) of the 
National Labor Relatons Act (NLRA). 
The NLRB ruled that the union did not 
violate the act because handbilling was 
under the proviso for consumer publicity 
used to inform a distributor's customers 
that the manufacturer or producer of mer-
chandise was involved in a labor dispute. 
The ruling was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. However, 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed and remanded the case because 
the proviso to § 8(b)(4) did not cover the 
situation where the mall merchants do not 
distribute the construction company's pr~ 
ducts. The Court asked for a determina-
tion of whether the hand billing fell within 
the prohibition of § 8(b)(4), and, if so, 
whether it was protected by the first 
amendment. Id. at ----> 108 S. Ct. 1392. 
The NLRB reversed itself on remand 
and decided that there was a violation of § 
8(b)(4) because "handbilling and other 
activity urging a consumer boycott consti-
tuted coercion." Id. However, the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had 
serious doubts about whether § 8(b)(4) 
could constitutionally ban peaceful hand-
billing not involving nonspeech elements 
and reversed the NLRB using the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, Id. Due to important 
labor and constitutional law issues, the 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 
Although the NLRB's interpretations of 
the NLRA are normally entitled to defer-
ence, under the "Catholic Bishop's Rule", 
where an otherwise acceptable construc-
tion of a statute would raise serious consti-
tutional problems, the Court will construe 
the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such construction is plainly contrary to 
the intent of Congress. Id. at -0 108 S. 
Ct. 1397. The NLRB's construction of the 
statute, as applied in this case, posed 
serious questions of the validity of § 8(b)( 4) 
under the First Amendment. Id. 
The handbilling was peaceful, truthfully 
told customers about an existing labor dis-
pute, and did not involve picketing. Simi-
lar acts by the union, such as generally 
discussing low wages via literature distrib-
uted in town or radio advertisements, 
would not violate the statute and would be 
protected by the First Amendment. Simi-
larly, handbills discussing a specific wage 
dispute should be equally protected. To 
hold otherwise "would require deciding 
serious constitutional issues." Id. at __ , 
108 S. Ct. at 1397-98. 
Next the Court reviewed whether Con-
gress intended to ban handbilling under § 
8(b)(4). The legislative history, however, 
clearly showed that a "union can hand out 
handbills at the shop, can place advertise-
ments in newspapers, can make announce-
ments over the radio, and can carry on all 
publicity short of ambulatory picketing in 
front of a secondary site." Id. at __ , 108 
S. Ct. at 1404. 
The decision in DeBartolo establishes 
that the proviso to § 8(b)(4) of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act is a clarification 
which allows unions to conduct informa-
tional activity short of picketing. Ii The 
proviso need not be treated as establishing 
an exception to an otherwise all encom-
passing NLRA prohibition on publicity. 
Rather it provides protection from com-
munication, such as picketing, which 
would be considered coercive. 
-Andrea White Steele 
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n: 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT A 
STATE MAY NOT CATEGORICAL-
LY PROHIBIT TARGETED, TRUTH-
FUL AND NONDECEPTIVE 
LAWYER ADVERTISING. 
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 
_U.S . ......, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a 
state may not, consistent with the first and 
fourteenth amendments, categorically pr~ 
hibit lawyers from soliciting legal business 
for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and 
nondeceptive letters to potential clients 
known to face a particular legal problem. 
In 1985 Shapero, a member of the Ken-
tucky Bar, sought the Kentucky Attorneys 
Advertising Commission's approval of a 
letter that he proposed to send to potential 
clients who had pending foreclosure 
actions. In part the proposed letter stated 
that "you may be about to lose your 
home," that "[f]ederallaw may allow you 
to keep your home by ORDERING your 
creditor [sic] to STOP," that "[y]ou may 
call my office for FREE information," and 
that "[i]t may surprise you what I may be 
able to do for you." The Commission did 
not find the letter to be false or misleading 
but found it contrary to the existing Ken-
tucky Supreme Court rule which prohib-
its direct mailing to specific individuals as 
distinguished from mailing to the general 
public. 108 S. Ct. at 1919. The Commis-
sion, citing Zauderer v. Office of Dis· 
ciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), 
offered its view that the Kentucky rule vi~ 
lated the first amendment and recom-
mended that it be changed. 108 S. Ct. at 
1920. 
Shapero then sought an advisory opin-
ion as to the rule's validity from the Ken-
tucky Bar Association's Ethics 
Committee. The Committee indicated 
that the rule was consistent with the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model 
Rule 7.3. After reviewing the Committee's 
opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court, 
--------------------------------- 19.1/ The Law Forum-39 
citing Zauderer, replaced its rule with the 
ABA Model Rule 7.3. Model Rule 7.3 also 
prohibits targeted, direct mail solicitation 
by lawyers for pecuniary gain without a 
particularized finding that the solicitation 
is false or misleading. The court did not 
address the specific problem with its rule 
nor how Rule 7.3 corrected it. fd. 
The Supreme Court considered the issue 
of whether the blanket prohibition of Rule 
7.3 was consistent with the first amend-
ment. The Court stated that a lawyer's 
right to advertise was constitutionally pro-
tected commercial speech, and if not false 
or deceptive and did not concern unlawful 
activity, it could only be restricted by a 
compelling governmental interest. "[S]tate 
rules that are designed to prevent the 
potential for deception and confu-
sion ... may be no broader than reasona-
bly necessary to prevent the perceived 
evil." fd. at 1921 (quoting fn re R./If.]., 455 
U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
In Zauderer, the Supreme Court struck 
down on Ohio rule that "categorically 
prohibited solicitation of legal employ-
ment for pecuniary gain through advertise-
ments containing information or advice, 
even if truthful and nondeceptive, regard-
ing a specific legal problem." 108 S. Ct. at 
1921. It distinguished written advertise-
ments from in-person solicitation by law-
yers, which it had previously held in 
Ohralik 'U. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 
447 (1978) may be banned by a state. The 
Court reasoned that Ohio could not pre-
vent Zauderer from mass-mailing to the 
general population his offer to represent 
women who were injured by the Dalkon 
Shield any more than it could prevent the 
publication of the advertisement in the 
newspaper. Similarly, the Court reasoned 
that if Shapero's letter was not false or 
deceptive, Kentucky could not constitu-
tionally prohibit him sending identical let-
ters to targeted individuals. 108 S. Ct. at 
1921. 
The Supreme Court observed that the 
Kentucky Court disapproved Shapero's 
letter because it was directed to a specific 
group of people who were known to need 
legal services rather than a broader group 
who may have found the services useful. 
However, the Court determined that the 
"First Amendment does not permit a ban 
on certain speech merely because it is more 
efficient .... " fd. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court conclud-
ed that its ban on targeted, direct mail 
solicitation was proper because of the 
potential abuse by lawyers. By analogy to 
Ohralik (a state could categorically ban all 
in-person solicitation), the court observed 
that direct mail solicitation incurred the 
same pitfalls as in-person solicitation by a 
lawyer. The Supreme Court, however, dis-
missed that notion by stating that any 
potential client would feel equally "over-
whelmed by his legal troubles and will 
have the same impaired capacity for good 
judgment regardless of whether a lawyer 
mails him an untargeted letter or exposes 
him to a newspaper advertisement ... or 
instead mails a targeted letter." fd. at 1922. 
Additionally, the Court found the Ken-
tucky court's reliance on Ohralik mis-
placed since that decision was based on 
two factors. First, there was a strong possi-
bility of improper lawyer conduCt in face-
to-face solicitation. Secondly, there were 
the inherent difficulties of regulating in-
person solicitation since it was not open to 
public scrutiny and therefore it had greater 
potential for abuse. The Court stated that 
the mode of communication makes the dif-
ference since there is much less a risk in the 
targeted, direct-mail solicitation context. 
Written communication did not involve 
"the coercive force of the personal pres-
ence of a trained advocate," fd. at 1922 
(quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642). 
The Court differentiated written solici-
tation from in-person solicitation and dis-
cussed methods which could be used to 
regulate targeted, direct mail solicitations. 
For example, unlike in-person solicitation, 
an advertisement can be set aside, ignored, 
or discarded. 108 S. Ct. at 1923. They sug-
gested that a state could regulate for poten-
tial abuses by requiring a lawyer to file any 
solicitation letter with a state agency al-
lowing the state to supervise and apply 
sanctions to actual abuses. Likewise, the 
state could require the lawyer to prove the 
validity of the statements made in the let-
ter, how the information was discovered 
and verified, or it could require solicitation 
letters to be labeled as an advertisement. 
The Court emphasized that the free flow 
of commercial speech was valuable enough 
to impose the burden and cost on regula-
tors in their efforts to scrutinize it. fd. at 
1924. 
Finally, the Court addressed the Ken-
tucky court's contention that Shapero's 
letter was so particularly overreaching that 
it was unworthy of first amendment pro-
tection. The Kentucky court highlighted 
two features which it addressed as being 
high pressure and overbearing solicitation. 
The first feature was the letter's use of 
uppercase letters (e.g., "Call NOW, don't 
wait"; it is FREE"). Secondly, the court 
objected to the language in the letter (e.g., 
"It may surprise you what I may be able 
to do for you") which it termed as "pure 
salesman puffery, enticement for the unso-
phisticated, which commits Shapero to 
nothing." fd. 
The Supreme Court conceded that such 
style may attract the reader's attention 
more readily than a bland statement, but a 
truthful, nondeceptive letter could never 
be equated with face-to-face solicitation 
which could lead to overreaching. "And as 
long as the first amendment protects the 
right to solicit legal business, the State may 
claim no substantial interest in restricting 
truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicita-
tion to those least likely to be read by the 
recipient." fd. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court seems 
to suggest that almost anything can be 
done to solicit clients as long as it is not 
false, misleading, misrepresented, or in 
person. This decision may have dealt a 
crippling blow to Rule 7.3 of the Maryland 
Rules of Professional Conduct which is 
mirrored after the ABA Model Rule 7.3, 
the subject of the Court's ruling. 
-George L Cintron 
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